The Multi-Polar Role of Russia’s Primakov Doctrine and the Cert…
Sam Kessler
From left to right: Joe Biden, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin. SOURCE: Nikkei Asia (Nikkei montage/Reuters/Getty Images)
By Sam Kessler
The new international system is one that has been built on trends, patterns, and indicators that have been in the making for several years. Trends are typically built on catalyst events and scenarios that cascade into a wide variety of situations and new norms that tend to result into both expected and unexpected circumstances. The conditions of the new international system that is currently transpiring in this era of rising multi-polarism have been projected for well-over a decade now. As a result, time has caught up over the years as cataclysmic events have led to what has become the new national and global strategic reality, which greatly impacts the stability of the liberal international economic world order that has been in place since the end of the Second World War.
Such recent catalysts that come to mind are the following:
The Russian annexation of Crimea and its supported insurrection in the Donbas region of Ukraine resulting into ongoing and increasing tensions between the U.S. (its NATO/EU allies) and Russia.
The US-China trade war dispute.
The CoVid-19 pandemic shutting down and causing havoc to global and national political, social, health, economic, and supply chain systems.
The U.S. disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Rising U.S. and international hyper-politicization, debt, and inflation impacting an increase in domestic and civil unrest worldwide.
The increasing reports of adversarial espionage and subversive activities on mainland U.S. and assets abroad.
The growing instability in the Middle East regarding Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.
The Russian-Ukrainian war and increasing threat for a full-fledged war between the U.S. and its European allies with Russia.
The increase in great power strategic positioning in the Indo-Pacific in response to the rising threat of Chinese expansionism.
The rising tensions over both the South China Sea and a potential Chinese CCP invasion of Taiwan and U.S involvement in its protection.
The closer relationship between China and Russia as well as other members that make up the BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Transition from a Unipolar to a Multi-polar System
The world of 2008 is significantly different from 2022 and has completely transformed from a Unipolar international system to becoming a multi-polar opposite where players from the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.) aligned nations (including potential members like has resulted into three decades of closer and friendlier relations
The New Strategic Reality is the Return of Multi-polarism and Great Power Competition
There have been warning signs for several years regarding the predicted and forecasted evolution of the new strategic reality regarding the rise of multi-polarism and great power competition. For example, C. Thomas Fingar and other experts in the national security and intelligence communities warned U.S. policymakers in the 2008 volume of the National Intelligence Council’s report called, “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World” that specifically stated the following:
Click to open report.
“Historically, emerging multi-polar systems have been more unstable than bipolar or unipolar ones. Despite the recent financial volatility—which could end up accelerating many ongoing trends—we do not believe that we are headed toward a complete breakdown of the international system, as occurred in 1914-1918 when an earlier phase of globalization came to a halt. However, the next 20 years of transition to a new system are fraught with risks. Strategic rivalries are most likely to revolve around trade, investments, and technological innovation and acquisition, but we cannot rule out a 19th century-like scenario of arms races, territorial expansion, and military rivalries.
This is a story with no clear outcome, as illustrated by a series of vignettes we use to map out divergent futures. Although the United States is likely to remain the single most powerful actor, the United States’ relative strength—even in the military realm—will decline and US leverage will become more constrained. At the same time, the extent to which other actors—both state and nonstate—will be willing or able to shoulder increased burdens is unclear. Policymakers and publics will have to cope with a growing demand for multilateral cooperation when the international system will be stressed by the incomplete transition from the old to a still-forming new order.” (Global Trends 2025, 2008)
The war between Russia and Ukraine as well as tensions over China and Taiwan are simply part of a much bigger picture and long-term problem that is being illustrated in the current evolution of the international system. This dilemma can be traced back to at least the formation of what is known as the U.S., China, and Russia triangle balance of power system that was cultivated by the United States and People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the 1970s via the leadership of President
After all, China no longer had friendly relations with the Soviet Union that had soured by the 1960s. As a result, the United States enabled the PRC’s growth by giving it diplomatic recognition and establishing the roots of what would eventually become known as a historical mega trade and manufacturing relationship. It eventually helped Beijing become a thriving economic superpower that would end up rivaling Washington and other leading world players. This era began after the Cold War had ended and the agreed entry of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) into the World Trade Organization
Assuming the U.S., China, and Russia Triangle Would Always be in America’s Favor
China’s President Xi Jinping, right, sits beside Premier Li Keqiang, left, as former president Hu Jintao is assisted to leave from the closing ceremony of the 20th China’s Communist Party’s Congress at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on October 22, 2022. SOURCE: AFP
It’s important to note that U.S. policymakers had assumed that it could prevent a future Sino-Russian relationship from occurring because of Beijing’s strong desire to develop and improve its economic and social living conditions for its own people. This approach was incorporated by U.S. policymakers while also assuming that it would lead to ending the dictatorial, ideological, and totalitarian nature of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) system. In other words, the grand assumption by the U.S. was that a stronger and more open Chinese economy would lead to greater freedom, openness, and democracy in China. However, fifty years later the CCP remains intact and in full control of the PRC with even stricter controls on its citizens. In addition, there continue to be excessive references to communism and socialism with Chinese characteristics outlined in CCP rhetoric, as well as in President Xi Jinping’s speech 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party
Moreover, it was a major coup and victory by American policymakers that prevented the formation of a
Christopher Layne mentioned in his 1997 paper
“The key elements of this strategy are creation and maintenance of a U.S.-led world order based on preeminent U.S. political, military, and economic power, and on American values; maximization of U.S. control over the international system by preventing the emergence of rival great powers in Europe and East Asia; and maintenance of economic interdependence as a vital U.S. security interest. The logic of the strategy is that interdependence is the paramount interest the strategy promotes; instability is the threat to interdependence; and extended deterrence is the means by which the strategy deals with this threat.” (International Security, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1997).
However, it is important to note that countries like China and Russia had realized that it was essential for them to play out a long game to deal with the U.S. as the preeminent superpower in the liberal international rules-based order that had been established after World War Two. The result is a new international system and strategic reality that is greatly challenging the established structure with the re-emergence of multi-polarism becoming the new norm. This also raises important questions regarding longstanding values, norms, alliances, and relationships in the realm of geopolitics and great power competition in the 21st century.
Brzezinski’s Grand Prediction of China and Russia Forming a Strategic Alliance
Former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in 2015 at a CSIS forum. Source: Joshua Roberts/Reuters
Zbigniew Brzezinski was not only one of America’s leading strategic thinkers in the 20th century but was also considered having been a legendary U.S. national security and foreign policy advisor as well. The previous year before he died in 2017, Brzezinski had begun sounding the alarm to the he is quoted as having warned that:
“The most dangerous scenario would be that a grand coalition of China and Russia…united not by ideology but by complementary grievances. This coalition would be reminiscent in scale and scope of the challenge once posed by the Sino-Soviet bloc, though this time China would likely be the leader and Russia the follower.”
In other words, Brzezinski implied that Moscow would likely be the junior partner
The New International System and its Components
Image of 4D Chess symbolizing the new multi-polar international system. SOURCE: H.P.
The new international system is one that is quickly evolving into a strategic multi-polar reality constantly changing and possessing more adversaries with capabilities
Great power politics and realism in international relations is back creating cognitively compromised
Dealing with these long-term situational scenarios will require mindsets that are lean, savvy, resourceful, multi-disciplinary, strong minded, creative, adaptive, cunning, proactive, volunteer-driven, and being results oriented. In addition, this new strategic reality will also require a great deal of courage, faith, and conviction-oriented mindsets to deal with these issues with great skill, patience, haste, determination, humbleness, and wisdom. These will be required to maneuver the current situational dilemma and going forward to dealing with future cascading issues, scenarios, and events. Therefore, having the right mindset is essential for the new strategic reality era that is transpiring in real time.
After all, the U.S. has enjoyed being the preeminent power in the international system
Long-term Strategic Maneuvering Toward a Multi-polar World by China and Russia
The bi-polar system of the Cold War era evolved after the Soviet Union’s demise into a heightened and stimulated version of globalization that helped raise countries like the People’s Republic of China (PRC) out of poverty and into their own upward mobilities can be seen through the execution of soft power projection and the utilization of espionage, subversive and ideological influence operations
Unrestricted Warfare, Three Warfares Strategies, 36 Strategems, Weaponized Narratives, and Hybrid Warfare
Other than soft power projection, weaponized narratives, and subversion, it can also be exhibited via the subtle implementation of asymmetrical (unconventional) warfare tactics that are commonly utilized against a superior conventional force (politically, economically, socially, and militarily). These tactics can greatly impact all spheres of influence within a society during both times of peace and war. As a result, this approach enabled the Chinese regime’s muscle accumulation over the years while going mostly unopposed by the U.S. and its allies via the adoption of policies and concepts that stem from unrestricted warfare doctrine “Three Warfares” strategies 36 Stratagems
SOCHI, RUSSIA – MAY 16, 2018: Russia’s First Deputy Defense Minister, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov. SOURCE: Mikhail Klimentyev/Russian Presidential Press and Information Office/TASS
In addition, it is important to note that the Russian Federation also adapted their own version of asymmetrical warfare shortly after the disintegration of the former Soviet Empire in 1991. Hybrid warfare became the Russians key strategy for survival and relevance in the beginning of a new international system that their planners thought would eventually become multi-polar in time. Russian Chief of the General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, often known as the the “whole-of-government concept that fuses hard and soft power across many domains and transcends boundaries between peace and wartime.”
Former Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov. SOURCE MFA Russia
The Primakov Doctrine
However, Russian hybrid warfare can be best described as being the full creation of legendary foreign minister, Yevgeny Primakov, who forged what is known as the Primakov doctrine
Russia
Russia
Russia
With that said, Moscow’s utilization of hybrid warfare suggests a balance of hard and soft power elements to achieve its goals and objectives with risk management constantly at the forefront of implementation. Although, the poorly executed war in Ukraine seems to have been poorly managed in terms of overall risk management for the Russians. However, the Primakov doctrine a modern China and Russia that have been positioning themselves for several years through the utilization of asymmetrical and cognitive warfare tactics that enable them to challenge U.S. preponderance
Rebuilding the Chinese-Russian Relationship After the Cold War
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping toast during a visit to the Far East Street exhibition on the sidelines of the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, Russia September 11, 2018. SOURCE: Sergei Bobylev/TASS Host Photo Agency/Pool via REUTERS/File Photo
The repairing of the Chinese and Russian relationship has been evolving gradually that are periodically updated along military cooperation and aid
In addition, the rising power of China collaborating with resource rich Russia would prove to be lucrative if the two power’s standing relationship remain united and in sync in the long-term without any relationship hiccups. After all, the relationship and partnership did receive an update during a meeting just before the Russian invasion of Ukraine where Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping declared a “ no limits partnership
Prolonging the Russian and Ukrainian War Creates New Opportunities, Knowledge, and Power Vacuums
The war in Ukraine is teaching the international community realm of military operations, strategy, diplomacy, intelligence, national security, energy security, economic statecraft, drone warfare, nuclear weapons strategy, etc especially regarding the rules of siege warfare proteges and loyalists Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) politburo recent 20th Chinese Communist Party’s National Congress right to use force but will strive
The Questionable Shelf Life of a Chinese-Russian Strategic Alliance
Vyacheslav Molotov, Russian foreign minister, signs the non-aggression pact negotiated between Soviet Russia and Germany, at the Kremlin, Moscow. Standing behind him is his German counterpart Joachim von Ribbentrop (left), and Joseph Stalin (centre), 23 August 1939. SOURCE: The Guardian
China and Russia are ancient neighbors who lack a long-term historical consistency of trusting each other. This is essential to understand for those that are only focusing on this aspect of a relationship between Beijing and Moscow. Fractured alliances in a world where realism and realpolitik are predominant can survive until they’re no longer needed nor attractive to a partner. A primary example of this would be the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact while agreeing to not take military action pact was broken within two years Operation Barbarosa.
Examples like the German breaking of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact are essential to understand and put into context when examining both the likeliness and shelf life of a Chinese-Russian strategic alliance. After all, the 2014 Russian invasion of Crimea resulted into Western sanctions and the closer and streamlined relationship
Both Moscow and Beijing understand the potential for history to repeat itself. However, it is likely considered in the various good neighbor and partnership agreements that keep getting updated since the initial round that took place in the 1996 Strategic Partnership Coordination Agreement based on multipolarity as a strategy
China is Not Likely to End its Strategic Relationship with Russia in this Current Reality
A possible breakup in Chinese-Russian relations would happen if Beijing found it beneficial to end it suddenly and temporarily forego an invasion of Taiwan. However, this may also indicate that the international system has reached a level of multi-polarity that would be extremely difficult to reverse, as well as being tempting for Beijing to reconsider its relationship with Moscow. The Russian Far East
In addition, the Russian Far East is also lightly defended and heavily rich in resources and raw materials
Russia is Not Likely to End its Strategic Relationship with China in this Current Reality
While some experts may still doubt the potential of a strategic alliance occurring between Beijing and Moscow it is essential to assess the options that Russia may have if certain scenarios were to change abruptly. In other words, it raises an interesting question on if Russia can be weaned off its streamlined pivot to Asia (China) that began because of the 2014 Crimean annexation
In fact, Vladimir Putin during a September 2022 speech at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, mentioned that the current trajectory of the international system is to see Asia as the center of global growth. Putin is quoted as having said, the European Parliament recently
In addition, China’s long term demographics problem may potentially generate a lucrative opportunity down the road for Russia’s eastward Asian pivot in terms of geopolitical and economic maneuvering in that region. The low fertility rates caused by the one-child policy one-child policy in 2016
Furthermore, the support ratio between large surplus male population own demographic crisis that accelerating and may
Assessing the Reality and Looking at Possible Geopolitical Solutions and Scenarios
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy. SOURCE: NATO
Although Ukraine is receiving military aid from NATO and EU member states it is important to note that the likeliness of a direct kinetic fight with Russia is currently not in the strategic focus of the U.S. and its allies. Proxy wars with the help it does not mean there are no other options to consider
A fractured Chinese and Russian relationship are in the strategic interests
Image: U.S., China, Russia ; SOURCE: CSO
A primary goal could be to take advantage of existing remnants of instability and distrust on domestic civil unrest take a free agent
A Russian Multi-Vector Foreign Policy Strategy Can Still be an Option for Limiting Russia’s Reliance on China
Back in 2018, this author wrote a blog article called, “Repairing US-Russian Relations is Necessary to the Future of U.S. Grand Strategy”
A multi-vector foreign policy is a strategy commonly utilized by Central Asian and former Soviet republics Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
A brilliant example of multi-vector foreign policy strategy was discussed in this author’s 2018 blog article “The Prince” “The Art of War” The movie quotes say the
Meyer Lansky:
“We gotta get tough with Masseria and Faranzano. Only, we can’t afford a war. They got armies; we don’t.”
Arnold Rothstein:
“We got balls and brains; you got those, you don’t need an army…100 years ago, Austria was run by a prince named Metternich. Austria was weak, and its neighbors were strong; but Metternich was a cold, calculating fox. If one country got too strong, he organized an alliance against it. He would bring Europe to the brink of war, and then everybody thanked him when he kept war from happening. He barely had an army, but had Europe by the “kishkes”.
Despite the status of the Ukrainian war, Russia still has options outside of being reliant on China. It would depend on a lot of factors that can impact and stress-test the stability and loyalty between Beijing and Moscow. After all, the unique political and war time conditions led to a strict authoritarianism that took to heart the tenets of realism and realpolitik. When this becomes a hinderance in the Chinese-Russian relationship, it will severely limit the level of trust and reliability between the two ancient neighbors. Therefore, a Russian multi-vector foreign policy strategy would be beneficial to the U.S. and its allies since it is very unlikely in the current reality to witness closer and friendlier relations between Washington and Moscow. Although, it may be helpful in repairing US and Russian relations down the road with this strategy as well. Like history, this situation will eventually unfold as well as the story and narratives currently tied to it.
Nothing is New Under the Sun as History Always Repeats Itself in Any International System
It is important to note that the things being mentioned in the previous section and throughout this paper are usually not new situations and scenarios at all. In fact, nothing is ever new under the sun when it comes to dealing with national security, defense, intelligence, and foreign affairs related issues. This is especially true if it pertains to problems and threats requiring adequate and appropriate solutions. In many instances, seemingly new ideas and innovations are for the most part repackaged content that have been repurposed for new and different goals, objectives, and solutions.
Some questions to ask is who exactly is doing the repurposing, why it’s being repurposed, and is the repurposing of the old ideas and innovations both appropriate and accurately fits the problem with the correct solution. After all, the cookie cutter imitation concept is not usually the best answer to solving and figuring out how to deal with a problem and threat. A good example of this would be a friend in a college dormitory who regifted someone with a nice expensive French cuff dress shirt they didn’t want, and it ended up being too small for the recipient to wear. The moral of the story is that repurposed ideas and innovations that are aimed at creating solutions for new but old problems and scenarios should ensure that they work and are solving the problems instead of pouring more gasoline to the existing fires. In other words, it is often best to understand a situation or threat for what it has become. This also includes developing an appreciation for history since it often provides valuable lessons, insights, ideas, and inspiration for the savvy problem solver.
Conclusion
The new international system is more complexed since it has reached a post-globalization period and a new era of rising multi-polarism. These are trends and patterns that have been evolving and cascading for several years and explains why it is essential to understand how the new strategic reality evolved and nourished the immediate concerns that have become primary focuses by leaders, practitioners, laymen, and enthusiasts. With that said, multi-polarism is here to stay for the moment while actors in the international system readjust and reassess their roles and power projection capabilities in a world where realism and realpolitik will be more predominant going forward. These are times where everything and everyone is being tested that include experts, practitioners, leaders, ordinary citizens, established systems, existing partnerships, as well as old and new alliance structures. In addition, it will also require the need to reassess and upgrade the U.S. grand strategy. This will likely become a priority at some point as it will be essential to help the U.S. and its allies address the challenges of 21st-century multi-polarism more effectively.
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Sam Kessler is a writer, analyst, and consultant with a national security, global security, geopolitics, and business/finance background. He is also a Geopolitical Advisor for North Star Support Group and a contributor to other publications and outlets on related topics and issues. Sam also has an M.A. in National Security and Intelligence Analysis from American Military University (AMU), which is part of the American Public University System (APUS) and holds a B.A. in International Studies from Bradley University with an Economics minor. Sam can be contacted via his website/blog at www.samkessler.com LinkedIn
