Navigating the Road to Progress- International Political Economy

Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals

Academic Year 2022 2024

Navigating the Road to Progress

An International Political Economy Perspective on the Coastal Trans AfricanHighway 7s Stagnation

Dissertation submitted by

PEDER RØRVIG

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER’S IN

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Word count: 8471

Abstract

This master’s thesis delves into the development challenges of Trans--African Highway African Highway 7 (TAH 7), a significant infrastructure project spanning the West African coast between 7 (TAH 7), a significant infrastructure project spanning the West African coast between Dakar and Lagos. Regrettably, its development has been sluggish despite the urgent Dakar and Lagos. Regrettably, its development has been sluggish despite the urgent need for expansion. This thesis adopts a unique approach, utilizing International need for expansion. This thesis adopts a unique approach, utilizing International Political Economy as the framework to analyze historical legacies, trade interests, Political Economy as the framework to analyze historical legacies, trade interests, regional organizations, and corruption. This approach offers a fresh perspective on the regional organizations, and corruption. This approach offers a fresh perspective on the hihighway's long delay and slow development. ghway's long delay and slow development.

The research dives into historical legacy priorities and geographical challenges as colonial infrastructure significantly influences current development priorities. This colonial infrastructure significantly influences current development priorities. This path dependency hinders modern infrastructure projects such as TAH 7. Furthermore, path dependency hinders modern infrastructure projects such as TAH 7. Furthermore, I hI highlight the paradox where the evident need for infrastructure to support economic ighlight the paradox where the evident need for infrastructure to support economic growth is constrained by the exact conditions such development seeks to improve. I growth is constrained by the exact conditions such development seeks to improve. I also examine the role of weak regional organizations and corruption in impeding the also examine the role of weak regional organizations and corruption in impeding the procesprocess. Despite these challenges, the transformative potential of the African s. Despite these challenges, the transformative potential of the African Continental Free Trade Area to boost regional integration and economic development Continental Free Trade Area to boost regional integration and economic development inspires hope for the future. inspires hope for the future.

Analyzing these dimensions sheds light on the complex interplay between global and domestic factors that shape the formulation and implementation of economic policies domestic factors that shape the formulation and implementation of economic policies in the region. I highlight that a renewed commitment to addressing systemic issues, in the region. I highlight that a renewed commitment to addressing systemic issues, fostefostering transparency, and enhancing institutional capacity is not just a suggestion ring transparency, and enhancing institutional capacity is not just a suggestion but a necessity. These actions, when prioritized alongside sustainable development but a necessity. These actions, when prioritized alongside sustainable development practices, pave the way for unlocking the potential of this immense project promoting practices, pave the way for unlocking the potential of this immense project promoting economeconomic integration and social cohesionic integration and social cohesion.

INTRODUCTION

West Africa is home to one-third of the African population, almost half a billion people of 1.4 billion on the continent. Africa hosts the world's youngest and fastest-growing population, projected to go from 10 percent of the world population in 1960 to 40 percent in 2100. The 1000-kilometer stretch between Abidjan and Lagos will experience immense growth and melt into one substantial urban area, creating a new megapolis. Today, this coastal stretch inhabits 51 million people. By the end of the century, demographic projections expect the megapolis to become the largest and most dense urban cluster ever recorded on our planet, with half a billion inhabitants (Statista, 2024; Graham-Harrison, 2022). The Lagos to Abidjan corridor is the most populated section of the Coastal Trans African Highway 7 and is the highway corridor most likely to develop first. The puzzle for this thesis is to understand why the development of the TAH 7 has taken so long. Although the planning of the Trans Africa highway network began in the early 1970s, there has been very little development regarding many continent-crossing highways (Graham-Harrison, 2022; UNECA, 1973). This thesis aims to create a better understanding of the current state of the TAH 7. Therefore, I will answer the research question: “Why is the Coastal Trans-African Highway 7 between Lagos and Dakar in such a poor condition despite the need for further development?”. I will use International Political Economy analysis by applying a theoretical framework developed by Frieden and Martin (2002), focusing on how global and domestic interactions influence both global, regional, and domestic policy decisions.

This thesis focuses on coastal West Africa’s road infrastructure. Nigeria, the most populous country in West Africa, has a population of approximately 215 million and is expected to surpass 400 million people by 2050. Such population growth reaches extreme acceleration levels and is challenging for states and international organizations to cope with. Considering the past couple of centuries towards the 2100s, Africa will experience the fastest demographic growth in human history (Walters, 2021). It is not just Nigeria but also countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania that are predicted to at least double their populations by 2050. Some economists argue that Africa is on the brink of falling into further economic misery due to this growth. This is based on poor trust in crucial infrastructure in security, health, and education, predicting that large portions of the population will fall into extreme poverty. Optimists argue for trajectories such as those seen in China and India, which are possible for an African industrial revolution if the right economic policies are implemented (Anoba, 2019). Based on the uncertain projections of Africa’s economic future, I will investigate how better regional integration and mobility in West Africa is realistic since regional integration is crucial to economic growth (Hamill-Stewart, 2023). Africa lacks sufficient funds for all types of crucial infrastructure. The AfDB (2018) has explicitly expressed the need for USD 170 billion annually to fill the infrastructure gap.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theory applied in the thesis is international political economy (IPE) through “global and domestic interactions” by Frieden and Martin (2002). Their theory is rooted in the importance of domestic and international factors and how they influence economic policies and outcomes. Frieden and Martin argue that international economic policies are not always solely determined by global market forces or international institutions. It is important also to understand the interplay between domestic and international structures to grasp how economic policies are formulated and implemented fully. Domestic political and economic interests also significantly influence international political and economic interests, policies, and more structural factors, such as history and colonial legacies, geography, and path-dependent effects of previous infrastructure investments. International political and economic interests are also greatly influenced by domestic interests. Frieden and Martin’s IPE theory is relevant to explain the thesis as they highlight that understanding the interactions between global economic structures and domestic political dynamics is crucial to understanding the formulation and implementation of economic policies. Since the TAH 7 runs through most coastal ECOWAS nations, the theory will apply insight into domestic political and economic interests and how it has affected the current state of the West African Highway 7. I will also assert how the regional structures work to facilitate the interplay between the domestic and international factors for policy development.

Their theory, “The two-level game” framework, helps understand domestic-international interaction, also called “reverberation” by Robert Putnam and “synergy” by Jack Snyder. Synergy represents new possibilities and opportunities based on interaction between the domestic and international levels. It can happen when negotiators use international negotiations to create previously unattainable outcomes and expand a nation's domestic “win sets” (Frieden & Martin, 2002, p. 123). The concept of two-the-level game theory can elucidate the critical role of trade interests and regional organizations like the AfDB, ECOWAS, and the AU play when shaping economic policies. These organizations have the potential to either drive or hinder regional integration and economic diversification efforts through mediating between domestic and international interests and can affect the development and execution of regional projects like the TAH 7. By bringing up this perspective of the two-level game and global and domestic interactions, we can better grasp the importance of cohesive action among regional bodies to address common challenges and simultaneously also leverage opportunities for collective growth and development (Frieden & Martin, 2002, p. 124).

The essential areas of geography, history, and economy are helpful to understanding today's current state of infrastructure development in the chosen countries for this study. The dissertation is therefore divided into four segments, where IPE theory on global and domestic interactions is applied.

Firstly, the analysis will investigate how geographical challenges and colonial legacies affect underdevelopment. For geographical challenges, I will consider how historically topographical factors such as rivers, mountain ranges, and terrain have led to different infrastructure strategies and priorities. Then, moving on to the colonial legacies by analyzing the impact of colonial-era infrastructure projects on today's infrastructure, which is known for prioritizing resource extraction over regional integration and development.

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Secondly, I will analyze trade interests in coastal West Africa from three viewpoints: domestic, regional, and international trade. For domestic trade, I will examine how local trade dynamics and interests within chosen West African countries influence the demand for investment in transport infrastructure. Examples of such include domestic businesses, agriculture, and different markets. The impact of regional trade agreements and the economic integration efforts within West Africa on infrastructure development will be analyzed for a similar purpose (UNCTAD, 1999). Lastly, international trade and its import and export might have different outcomes on infrastructure needs in various countries. Therefore, I will investigate the interests of global stakeholders in improving regional infrastructure, such as multilateral cooperations, development banks, and foreign governments.

Further, “weak” regional organizations will be analyzed. Here, we will look at the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union, and the African Development Bank (AfDB) and their roles in regional infrastructure projects, especially their effectiveness, resources and political will to support such projects.

Lastly, I will look at the impact and mechanisms of corruption in coastal West African countries and organizations to understand how it affects the allocation of funds, how contracts are awarded, and project execution related to TAH 7 by identifying mechanisms of corruption such as embezzlement, bribery, and nepotism. The TAH 7 runs through countries that score high on the corruption score index. Corruption is a challenging barrier to infrastructure development through diverting resources, contributing to creating fair competition amongst contractors and discouraging domestic and foreign investment in large-scale projects (U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, n.d.).

Analyzing these four topics will help us better understand how the interplay between domestic and international political economy dynamics has shaped the development of TAH 7.

Additionally, I will consider Nigeria’s role as a regional hegemony state regarding how the country affects the development of the TAH 7. Hulse’s (2016) research on “Regional Powers and Leadership in Regional Institutions” zooms in on Nigeria in its ECOWAS involvement. She emphasizes that regional hegemonies often fail to act as hegemonies in their region, such as fostering better regional governance, and are expected to “run” the regional institutions. However, examples from India, Brazil, and South Africa show disappointing examples of the state's capabilities to act as a regional power. They are referred to as “failed giants” that perhaps will produce good policy sometimes when they are willing and able to tackle political and economic challenges in their region. Hulse suggests Nigeria has abandoned its role as a regional hegemon, which I will draw parallels in the analysis.

BACKGROUND

History of the Trans African Highway 7

Before analyzing the underdevelopment and slow growth of the TAH 7 through an IPE perspective on geographical and colonial legacies, trade interests, weak regional organizations, and corruption, it is essential to briefly understand our focused region's general geography, history, and economics. This chapter also helps build an understanding of the IPE theory of “global and domestic interactions” by Frieden and Martin (2002) to understand the current dynamics in the region better. They claim through their theory that international, political, and economic policies and relations are not possible to fully understand by only looking at international institutions and global market forces. Geography and economy are topics that actively affect and challenge political and economic interests, both domestic and international (Knox et al., 2020, p. 61), which helps explain the development of TAH 7. The planning process, background on regional integration, political and IO decisions, and Nigeria decide much of the development process of TAH 7.

In 1971, in Addis Ababa, the first Trans-African Highway Coordinating Committee met to set up what was classified as a high-priority project, the Trans-African Highway Bureau, to act as a secretariat to the Committee. For this first meeting, the Committee presented five suggestions for new, continent-linking highways connecting north to south and east to west in a web of paved roads to foster regional and continental integration and trade., promote tourism, and generate employment and higher income. The Committee planned a highway from Lagos, Nigeria, to

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Nouakchott, Mauritania, passing through Benin, Togo, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, the Gambia, and Senegal, 12 countries in total, and 4,787 kilometers long.

Physical conditions. At the time, 63 percent was covered in bitumen surface, 17 percent gravel, and 20 percent earth roads or tracks only suitable during the dry season. The most recent report covering an update in the percentages originates from a report from 2003, stating that 83 percent were paved, while 32 percent are categorized as “poor condition”, 56 percent in fair condition, and only 9 percent in good condition (Swedo, 2003, pp. 158-170). Paved roads in Africa sometimes contain more potholes than actual pavement. This road, later known as the TAH 7 and West-African Highway, connects with the Trans-Sahelian road from Dakar in Senegal to N’djamena in Tchad, which again will give access to Mombasa in Kenya, Cairo in Egypt, and Gaborone in Botswana (UNECA, 1977). This study's geographical limitation will exclude Nouakchott from Mauritania and use Dakar in Senegal instead since more recent African Development Bank reports only mention Dakar.

Map: The planned route for the TAH 7 between Dakar and Lagos (Sweco, 2003)

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An example of how both regional and continental integration is possible is the Pan-American Highway stretching from Alaska to southern Chile. The planning began in the 1920s, eventually connecting Texas to Panama and, in later decades, connecting the North American and South American states. Connecting the continents proved impossible due to environmental factors such as wetlands and conservation. However, the Pan-American Highway illustrates a compelling model for the TAH 7 and Trans-African Highway Project. The Pan-American Highway illustrates precisely how an extensive and vast highway network promotes regional integration and economic diversification (Suman, 2007).

Economic Impacts of the Abidjan-Lagos Corridor

For obvious reasons, the corridor between Abidjan and Lagos has been a priority compared to the Dakar to Abidjan corridor. According to AfDB (2023 c), the soon-to-be megapolis accounted for circa 75 percent of the trade in the subregion of coastal West Africa and is contemplated as the spine for multi-modal trade logistics. As the African Development Fund describes it, The Abidjan to Lagos corridor is a subset of the Trans African Highway Network and the TAH 7, and the 1028 kilometers running between Place de la Republique in Abidjan and Mile 2 in Lagos is a critical corridor for socio-economic development of West Africa because it weaves together the connections with a rail network and several major airports and ports. Additionally, it accesses north-south road connections with the landlocked countries of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad, and the highway will also contribute to the Enugu-Bamenda corridor. This corridor connects south-eastern Nigeria to south-western Cameroon, creating a bridge between West and Central Africa. According to the AfDB, such a connection will drastically increase the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). However, the planned study for the Abidjan-Lagos Corridor In a new regional integration action plan released by the AfDB in 2023 (c), the goal is to develop the whole corridor in a 6-lane highway. The road segment in Eastern Ghana, Togo, and Benin has already built a four-lane highway format. Benin and Togo have also established one-stop border crossings to reduce travel time. AfDB expects the intra-trade volume among ECOWAS countries

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to increase from 11 percent in 2011 to 15 percent in 2025. However, the recent announcement of the ECOWAS withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger might have a different outcome from the projection. AfDB also notes that the travel time between Lagos and Abidjan has been reduced from 75 to 36 hours due to the mentioned upgrades. For example, the border crossing between Togo and Benin reduced from 7 to 3 hours between 2015 and 2020. It is also noteworthy that the trade between Benin and Togo increased by 20 percent from 2010 to 2014, underlining the rapid trade and traffic increase on the corridor (AfDB, 2023 c).

The Trans-African Highway 7 is divided into two segments: Dakar to Abidjan and Abidjan to Lagos, which together form the TAH 7. The most recent update from the AfDB (2023 c) as of November 2023 indicates the current challenges and remaining works. Recently, improvements have been made to the Southern Senegal and Senegambia bridges, making it possible to transport agricultural production to neighboring countries such as The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, and Guinea. Moving south to Liberia, the Mano River Union Road Development, the AfDB has sponsored roads that will break isolation for many rural areas to access the TAH 7 and Cote d’Ivoire. Yet plenty of mud roads across Guinea Bissau and Guinea need pavement, but there are plans to replace these roads and build a bridge to replace a ferry crossing. During the last decade, road upgrades have led to an increase in trade volumes. Annual trade volume between Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea increased from 103 million tons in 2013 to 139 million in 2019, and trade from Cote d’Ivoire to Liberia increased from 445 million tons of goods in 2017 to 560 million tons in 2022. In the corridor overall, customs formalities were reduced from 4 hours in 2011 to 2 hours in 2016. Due to road infrastructure development, Senegal and the Gambia increased from 2.7 to 3.7 percent and 3.8 to 4.8 on the Global Competitive Index (AfDB, 2023 c).

Nigeria is not just the region's largest economy; it is also Africa's largest economy, with a GDP of 477 billion USD, beating Egypt, South Africa, and Morocco. In West Africa, other powerful economies are Ghana (73bn), Cote d'Ivoire (70bn), and Senegal (27bn) (Statista, n.d.), clearly earning Nigeria as West Africa’s hegemon.

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According to (Lake, 2012, p. 557), a hegemon is a materially dominant state that can impose its normative views of global or regional order on other countries. It implies an ideological dimension favoring power over ideas (Hulse, 2016).

METHODOLOGY

I use document analysis to analyze the thesis, incorporating most of the documents from the African Development Bank’s press releases, concept notes, annual reports, and action plans. The literature also contains academic articles from international relations, history, economic, and political journals. Some recent information is gathered from respected news outlets. sources. This method is maintained throughout the thesis.

The limitation of this study regarding data collection was the difficulty of finding accurate and specific information to answer the thesis question directly. The AU and AfDB have different reports and research available, but these are often factual and quite basic for promoting further studies on regional infrastructure. ECOWAS does have available press releases and official documents, but overall, it has not been easy to access specific information about detailed plans and schedules for the TAH 7. Therefore, I have primarily used data from the AU, AfDB, and the UN from other African regions to generalize structures and behaviors. In academic research, it was challenging to find specific research on the region or specific countries, and therefore, these inputs act as generalizations to give context to the dissertation. For several months, I also tried to reach out to researchers from universities in Ghana and politicians through my network without being able to get in touch with anyone. Reaching out to high-level people in Ghana is a hierarchical process. However, I cannot know if these possible interviewees would have more information (or the possibility to share) than what is published.

GEOGRAPHICAL AND COLONIAL LEGACIES

For this chapter, I will argue that colonial infrastructure development emphasized extraction rather than regional integration and has had a lasting impact on the region’s economic and infrastructure development patterns. The geographical

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challenges in coastal WA correlate with the historical legacies and have influenced the current infrastructure priorities and capabilities.

According to Huillery (2009), early colonial investments significantly affected current outcomes. Paul Bairoch, an economic historian, said: “There is no doubt that a large number of negative structural features of the process of economic underdevelopment have historical roots going back to European colonization” (Bairoch, 1993, p. 88). Current infrastructure development in West Africa, especially in Francophone West Africa, was determined by colonial public works.

Trade history

Many pre-colonial trade routes in West Africa can be divided into three categories. There were local trade routes linking villages and towns in the area, regional and inter-state trade routes, and, lastly, international “highways” linking states and regions together. According to Skinner (1964), many of the historical trade routes went from the coastal cities of Lagos, Accra, and Monrovia, moving northwards into the hinterlands of West Africa, which were connected by a vast web of continental highways. Ajayi (2018) researched the trade and market management in pre-colonial West Africa, investigating the indigenous economy, and concluded that West Africa benefitted significantly from trade and the market economy found before colonization. The most common trade dynamic was between the coast and savannah, where people in the savannah needed salt and fish, while coastal people needed Shea butter, hides, and skin products. It is important to mention that the forested coastal-near region is arable for a wide range of agriculture in West Africa. It also inhibits the tsetse fly, which is deadly to livestock. Therefore, people in the savannah and the Sahel had important trade dynamics with coastal populations and vice versa. International trade occurred, too, in the form of long caravans, sometimes with several thousand traders, but these went north and east on the continent, on the Trans-Saharan trade routes. Slaves were mainly brought along this route until the trade of slaves got centered toward the trade posts on the coast established by Europeans (Ajayi, 2018).

Colonial infrastructure and trade

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When connecting coastal infrastructure in West Africa to geography and history, the colonial era under the British and French impacted the road and rail networks by building connections between the ports and sources of natural resources in the hinterlands to ship them home for the profit of their empires (Graham-Harrison, 2022). Regarding the colonial era in West Africa, the 15th century was when European states first began competing for control over territory and ports or trading posts. Colonialization significantly changed the political and economic landscape in the region as the European powers such as Britain, France, Portugal, and the Netherlands became dedicated to establishing trading posts and, eventually, colonies. Firstly, the Europeans were primarily interested in gaining from the lucrative slave trade and local products, and later on, they got more involved in exploiting natural resources and using agricultural resources. The West African societies, economy, and political structures were reshaped from pre-colonial times when the Europeans disrupted traditional government and ruling systems. New borders were drawn with little consideration of ethnic groups, their languages, and political structures. Britain's involvement in Sierra Leone is a valid example of complex involvement in their political institutions and economics. During the 19th century, Britain was on the frontiers of ending the slave trade while protecting British commercial interests. It certainly marked a shift in the economic and political dynamics in West Africa as Britain established a significant naval presence to protect the illegal slave trade. Simultaneously, they colonized more territory. Sierra Leone was established as a colony for liberated slaves. During the late 1800s and early 1900s, the British influence through missionary activities and naval presence helped integrate West Africa’s global economy despite mostly being from resource extraction. The extensive economic exploitation and changes in local governance structures laid the ground for West Africa’s development trajectory, and similar behavior was seen in other British colonies, too, such as in today’s Ghana and Nigeria (Britannica, n.d.).

The French operated in a similar manner, but they had strategies that were different from Britain’s. The assimilation policy instead aimed to integrate the colonies into the state of France administratively and culturally, trying to make the colonies act as

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overseas departments. On the other hand, the British employed direct rule in their colonies and used local rulers and structures to implement their preferred governments, allowing for autonomy and less cultural assimilation. The French and British different policies in their West African colonies did have an influence and impact on the transport infrastructure. Since the French direct rule and assimilation aimed more towards integrating the French state, the infrastructure in the colonies also tended to be centralized to a higher degree, focusing on simply connecting colonies directly to France. On the other hand, the British indirect rule led to less centralized infrastructure with a more systematic approach towards extracting resources from the colonial ports. These divisions are still visible today (Britannica, n.d.).

Postcolonial history varies significantly from country to country, depending on the former colonizer. However, most West African countries gained independence around the 1960s, establishing new political landscapes. This marked a significant shift, allowing African countries to lay their development paths despite the colonial legacies in economic structures and international relations. After the Europeans left, they left traces of their economic-focused exploitation, creating differences in the level of development in places based on their abundance of resources and economic potential (Britannica, n.d.).

This historical analysis reveals how West Africa’s infrastructure and economic development have been shaped by its geographical, colonial, and trade histories. Colonial demands for resource extraction altered the pre-colonial routes, and postcolonial challenges highlight a complex legacy affecting modern development efforts. The colonial focus on extracting resources instead of fostering regional integration has left the region with a path dependency that still impacts current infrastructure patterns. However, today’s demographic patterns are clustered along the coast, and understanding the historical influences opens opportunities for leveraging past trade networks better toward regional connectivity.

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TRADE INTERESTS

Regarding trade interests, I will investigate the alignment of trade interests at different regional levels, domestically, regionally, and internationally, and its significance of influences in the prioritization and development of projects like TAH 7.

As mentioned, West Africa has a booming population with an expanding economy, and many business opportunities to trade across the region exist. Unfortunately, poverty remains high in the region, and most countries lag behind in economic growth rates. One of the main challenges regarding trade is that the farmers and local firms produce and trade in highly localized markets, which does not lead to sufficient large-scale economies, which usually are required to gain attention from broad-based investments that can foster better-accelerated growth and poverty reduction. There are several reasons, like inefficient transportation and trade barriers along the corridor and the borders (USAID, n.d.). As mentioned earlier, there is a reduction from 4 to 2 hours for a border crossing, but it is still a slow procedure compared to European countries where border crossings are done in minutes or even a split second.

According to the AfDB, the five countries of Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Cote d’Ivoire have requested and put pressure on the ECOWAS Commission to speed up the completion of a detailed design study and a financial and implementation strategy. This study is needed for documentation to launch the highway expansion construction phase between Abidjan and Lagos. At the same meeting, the country's leaders also longed for cooperation between the ECOWAS Bank for Investments and Development (EBID) and the AfDB, combined with private sector funds and investments required to upgrade the TAH 7 (AfDB, 2023 a). The AfDB Multinational Concept Note for the Study for the Abidjan – Lagos Corridor Highway Development Project from September 2016 requested further studies and outputs to complement the technical study design, such as an establishment of a new, supra-national semi-autonomous corridor authority, which should also include a corresponding institutional, legal and operations and management framework. The Concept Note

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also longs for a spatial development framework and master plan for the corridor, including trade, transport, transit, and border procedures (AfDB, 2016). At the Africa Investment Forum 2023, 7 years after the Concept Note was made, the five eastern countries of the Dakar-Lagos corridor are still requesting better studies to support better funding and construction of the corridor (AfDB, 2023 a).

The AfDB had initially, before the July meeting in 2023, already contributed 25 million USD to fund the preparatory phase of the corridor project. Additionally, 15.6 million was collected during the Africa Investment Forum (AIF) in 2022, showing that there is economic interest in the project. During the meeting, the state leaders from the five eastern TAH 7 countries decided to establish a headquarters of the Abidjan-Lagos Committee Management Authority (ALCoMA) in Abidjan, containing representatives from the ECOWAS together with the five represented countries; they are delegated the responsibility of managing the project (AfDB, 2023 a).

According to the AfDB, there is a need for capitalization of the opportunities that AfCFTA offers to boost the emergence of a regional West African market for natural resources by supporting the development of regional value chains and supply chains, regional labor markets, and infrastructure such as the TAH 7. West Africa has vast natural capital and greater regional integration through regional integration and West African and African intra-regional trade has the potential to opened new economic opportunities regarding the valorization of natural resources exploitation and transformation (AfDB, 2023 b, p. 73). Furthermore, the AfDB wishes to pursue a policy direction that can sustainably address external sector exposure and move to be centered around an export-based manner. Yes, the region already has many operating harbors for import and export, but the TAH 7 would be a contributor and facilitator for improving domestic resource mobilization. Fiscal imbalances are described as drivers of external imbalances in several West African countries, and it is believed that regional integration through the TAH 7 can increase secondary commodities which would boost domestic economies significantly (AfDB, 2023 b, p. 32).

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The African Development Bank recently expressed the need to capitalize on the opportunities of the AfCFTA (African Continental Free Trade Area) to promote the growth of a regional market for natural resources by supporting the development of regional value and supply chains in combination with a regional labor market and regional infrastructure (2023 b, p. 73). The TAH 7 can unlock the potential of increased regional integration by making regional resources more available for better manufacturing possibilities. However, it is noteworthy to highlight the desperate need for reliable electricity to realize better regional integration for increased efficiency in several economic sectors, especially manufacturing and extractive industries. In West Africa, structural challenges to generating enough electricity are a concern. The grids are outdated, with limited investment capacity (AfDB, b, p. 25).

The African Development Bank points out that West African countries need industrial policies prioritizing competitiveness regarding exports to access and penetrate the global market. They believe that the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) benefits West Africa as it could potentially contribute to diversifying export destinations and import sources (AfDB, 2023 b, p. 7). Countries in West Africa are recovering from COVID-19, and the private sector actors’ balance sheets have shown improved liquidity, which the AfDB analysts believe will increase foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows, leading to the opportunity to leverage those opportunities. The 2023 West Africa Economic Outlook by AfDB indicated that West African and African investors should invest in the continent through “special trade agreements” specifically designed for regional and continental investors to strengthen regional integration. The AfDB recommends the AfCFTA as a suitable starting point for advancing new trade agreements (AfDB, 2023 b, p. 49). Further, the TAH 7 would facilitate a better environment for strengthening the value chain of West Africa's critical minerals sector. This sector requires investments in infrastructure to strengthen its ability to increase the manufacturing of finished or half-finished goods, especially in the critical minerals sector. TAH 7 would make exports, production, and better intra-regional and intra-African trade through the ECOWAS trade liberalization scheme and the AfCFTA (AfDB, 2023 b, p. 64).

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However, Nigeria's role in West Africa cannot be overlooked. With its status as the largest African economy, Nigeria has a say in its own backyard. Firstly, the country notably influences regional governance and trade liberalization. Not just that, Nigeria is also a dominant military force, which is also expected to lead engagement and initiatives within regional governance—ECOWAS. Despite the expectations, Nigeria has shown reluctance and obstructionism when engaging with the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS), which symbolizes a lack of leadership when facilitating better regional trade integration. Hulse (2016, p. 18-20) explains this behavior based on the influence of domestic opposition to trade liberalization while also working towards protecting local manufacturing and patronage networks. Furthermore, Nigeria played an essential role during the establishment and operationalization of the ECOWAS Court of Justice by influencing the design of the court for better protection of domestic interests. This was done by restricting individual access to trade and economic matters (Hulse, 2016, p. 20).

WEAK REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

My argument here is that weak regional organizations and insufficient cooperation between the states are indeed the main factors for the underdevelopment of TAH 7 since they cannot mobilize resources sufficiently. This, combined with poor alignment of national interests, leads to poor execution of regional projects.

De Melo and Tsikata's (2014) research on regional integration in Africa examines the challenges and aspects of the political and economic reasons for creating Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Their research better explains RECs' efforts in Africa and how challenging political and economic collaboration for development and growth can be. Most of the RECs, including ECOWAS, were created to foster economic growth through continental industrialization, with region-specific economic organizations divided across the continent to create a single African market (de Melo & Tsikala, 2014, p. 1, 4). However, RECs have not had the significant impact they were aiming for, and ECOWAS efforts for economic and regional integration can confidently be questioned.

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The trade between member countries has remained disappointing at relatively low numbers, and it can be linked with high trade costs, but most pressingly poor infrastructure and geographic barriers, which is a concerning challenge to deeper integration. Not only that, but the authors also argue that “artificial borders,” referring to ethnolinguistic diversity, suggest significant differences in policy preferences, which hinder the supply of goods through difficulties with adopting common regional policies (de Melo & Tsikala, 2014, p. 7, 8). Interestingly, their findings also illustrate that political motives and the REC's desire for regional security sometimes take precedence over economic goals during the formation of the RECs and their policies (Melo & Tsikala, 2014, p. 7, 8). Furthermore, they argue that RECs struggle to implement agreements because of differences in policy preferences and a lack of resources. Therefore, the authors suggest reducing trade costs within Africa before moving towards more advanced and complex forms of integration, as seen in Europe, for example. Also, there is a need for a more profound political commitment and more robust institutions in order to overcome the mentioned challenges (Melo & Tsikala, 2014, p. 11).

There is limited information on how the regional organizations in West Africa face challenges and act as insufficient cooperation mobilizers between states. However, looking at how organizations such as the AU, AfDB, and ECOWAS struggle in other areas will still construct a visualizer of how completing and contributing to a project such as the TAH 7 might be challenging for them. Maluleke and Bennett (2022) highlights the recent coup d’états in the Sahel region of West Africa as a significant concern for the effectiveness of the AU and ECOWAS as democratic institutions. The primary purpose of the AU is to mandate and promote good governance and democracy in Africa. Overall, scholars agree that the AU has failed to effectively pursue its goal of creating more peace and security on the continent. Perhaps the most pressing concern for the AU is the absence of shared common values and important governance principles among the member states. Compared with, for example, the EU, which has criteria for specific democratic standards, the AU only requires a member to be an African state. Maluleke and Bennet (2022) also describe the AU as an organization that has succumbed to the irresistible pressure of

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realpolitik. The AU struggles to balance resolving security challenges and normative objectives such as promoting democracy and human rights. The AU’s legal and political framework erodes when the organization uses personal preferences instead of consistently maintaining the legal framework. For example, the coup d’état in Chad was widely justified in the AU because of their strong military presence in their region, while the coup in Mali was condemned. The authors mention that other regional organizations, like the ECOWAS and others, do not mention the AU in their documents as important regarding “coordination and harmonization.” Sometimes, especially regarding security concerns, the AU loses responsibility for assisting in security issues whenever it fails to solve them (Maluleke & Bennet, 2022).

CORRUPTION

In this chapter, I shed light on the argument that corruption is a main barrier to infrastructure development since it undermines fair competition combined with diverting resources, which discourages foreign and domestic investments in large infrastructure projects such as TAH 7.

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To identify and create an overview of the corruption level in the sub-region of coastal West Africa the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2023 is used as it one of the leading indicators in the world. The score ranges from 0 to 100 where 0 is very corrupt. Sub-Saharan Africa averages a score of 33/100, and the geographical area for this study averages 33,6/100. On average, 90 percent of Sub-Saharan countries score under 50/100, which is considered alarmingly corrupt. Transparency International addresses that the region's persistent challenges originate from many years of poor funding in the public sector intensified by corruption and illegal financial flows that drain resources away from essential services (Transparency International, 2024).

West Africa has a massive natural capital, such as crude oil, minerals, natural gas, and forest and wildlife. In the vast Guinean forests, you will find one of Africa’s eight biodiversity hotspots, with great tourism potential and abundant natural resources. Ghana, Nigeria, and Niger are all ranked among the top ten with the best natural resources, and both Senegal and Burkina Faso lie in the Sudano-Sahelian zone, which gives plenty of natural resources too. West Africa is underexplored when it comes to mineral resources. Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso are the least underexplored countries in the Birimian Greenstone Gold Belt, which is found in Ghana, Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso. Natural resources are a blessing, but they can also lead to a “resource curse” (Sachs & Warner, 2001), which, unfortunately, many African countries struggle with as resources contribute to governance challenges, poverty in the region, and widespread corruption. Many countries in the region are Country Corruption index score Nigeria 25 Benin 43 Togo 31 Ghana 43 Cote d'Ivoire 40 Liberia 25 Sierra Leone 35 Guinea 26 Guinea-Bissau 22 The Gambia 37 Senegal 43 Average 33,6

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also dependent on natural resources from the global market, leading to a lack of economic diversification, resulting in making the region more vulnerable to fluctuation in global commodity prices (AfDB, 2023 b, p. 15)

Many of the economic challenges in West Africa, especially those connected to the “resource curse” (Sachs & Warner, 2001, p. 835), can be linked to forms of corruption and especially a trend of poorly run governments. The AfDB expresses that challenges connected to natural resource dependence and vulnerability to global commodity prices should be met with more effective natural resource policies and instruments with the capacity to finance sustainable and green economic growth in West Africa. Sachs & Warner (2001, p. 836) categorize the resource curse into four economic explanations: a decline in trade for commodity markets, weak economic links between resource and non-resource sectors, and the alignment of the “Dutch Disease,” of course. Another valid point Sachs and Warner point out is that resource abundance slows down entrepreneurial activity and innovation because the resource sector is more lucrative for those individuals. The same argument applies to government officials, who are tempted into rent-seeking and corruption instead of engaging more in pro-growth activities. The AfDB (2023 b, p. 67) describes countries such as Nigeria, Liberia, Mali, and Sierra Leone as countries with weak institutions to be the source of West Africa’s “resource curse,” which again is described as the primary source of a country’s corruption.

Compared to the other West African countries, Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, and Ghana have attracted more investments, especially within green infrastructure projects, which have inspired more private sector investment for the climate, according to the AfDB (2023 b, p 45). These three countries are known for less corruption and better governance with more vital public institutions than their neighbors. However, with its domestic market, Nigeria also attracts private sector investments, as the country is the most considerable economic power in Africa with the highest GDP (AfDB, 2023 b, p. 45). It is worth stating that Lagos Country in Nigeria alone would be the fourth largest economy in Africa if it were a country (Graham-Harrison, 2022).

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However, Nigeria is simultaneously struggling with one of the lowest scores on the corruption index amongst coastal West African countries (Transparency International, 2024). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2019) identifies corruption in Nigeria as one of the main challenges to the country’s ambition to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, combined with their domestic goal of lifting 100 million Nigerians out of poverty. Nepotism is widespread in both Nigeria and West Africa. Almost half of the public sector in Nigeria consists of applicants who got hired due to bribery, nepotism, or both. 21 percent of the adult population was offered bribes for their votes. 45 percent of all bribes paid to public officials are paid to hurry up or finalize an administrative procedure. Bribes in the private business/sector made up a quarter of all bribes in Nigeria, and the bribes were almost twice as large as the average bribe paid. Most interestingly, considering the connection to TAH 7, is which motives and services are behind the bribes paid to public officials. According to related categories of bribery linked to contract awards with rigged bid-winning, project implementation with embezzlement, ghost workers, and substandard materials, monitoring with inspection bribes and inflated invoices (UNODC, 2019, p. 37)

DISCUSSION

In this chapter, I will discuss how the theoretical framework on global and domestic interactions is relevant to the current multifaced challenges and situations regarding infrastructure development projects like TAH 7 to provide a more nuanced understanding of the difficulties regarding future development.

Firstly, TAH 7 illustrates a representative complex interplay between the colonial and historical legacies and modern infrastructure challenges in coastal West Africa. It is clear that both pre-colonial trade routes and highways and colonial infrastructure prioritized connections between important harbors and inland trade hubs or resource extraction sites. Colonial resource extraction had a significant effect on the contemporary underdevelopment of infrastructure due to the historic development patterns, and the results of this study had implications for regional integration and

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development. The colonial legacies contributed significantly to creating path dependency where old priorities and layouts constrain efforts for modern infrastructure development. This path dependency spans many sectors since there are many connections to resources and money. Therefore, it poses a significant challenge to the development of TAH 7 because it necessitates conceptual reimagining of infrastructure role in regional development in addition to the physical construction process. Another consideration is the challenges of the postcolonial efforts of building a new, cohesive regional identity and infrastructure network to meet the redefined infrastructure development priorities. The transition phase from colonial to independent was comprehensive, considering the radical shift in infrastructure priorities towards economic development and regional integration. Therefore, it is crucial to consider the colonial legacies' impact while simultaneously fostering innovation and collaboration, specifically in West Africa, with unique and local inputs. Integrating new technologies and fostering better regional cooperation while adopting sustainable development practices can pave the way for potentially making the TAH 7 a catalyst for economic growth and integration. This illustrates how “blank” the papers are for West Africans, considering the region does not have such infrastructure yet.

Nigeria’s infrastructure development paradox

Infrastructure investments and economic development in West Africa, particularly in Lagos in Nigeria, seem to embody a challenging paradox where investment acts as both a prerequisite and beneficiary of economic development. Nigeria, particularly all countries along the TAH 7, desperately needs more infrastructure investment to tackle poverty and foster better economic growth. Nevertheless, the coastal West African countries cannot fund regional highway development, which constrains these countries from alleviating the growth to which TAH 7 is seeking to contribute. As one of the regions in the world with the lowest infrastructure development and longest travel times, there is an obvious potential for infrastructure to catalyze economic development through better integration and connectivity and enhanced trade opportunities, with more job creation. Still, fulfilling this potential is hampered

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by the economic environment, corruption risks, and other competing priorities, such as education and health sectors, to name a few. This paradox illustrates the much-longed-for strategic investment in infrastructure that can contribute to unlocking economic benefits, potentially creating a righteous cycle of growth and development.

AfCFTA potential from TAH 7

Since its implementation, the African Continental Free Trade Area has gained extensive attention as a beacon of hope for transforming trade dynamics across Africa. TAH 7 could, without doubt, play a pivotal role in transiting West Africa’s trade into economic development across its member states by significantly facilitating intra-African trade and integration, acting as a main vein in the whole region. However, the AfCFTA faces several barriers to reaching efficiency, such as inadequate infrastructure, many bureaucratic hurdles, and inconsistent policy implementation, which weakens the free trade area's potential. Again, there is a need for harmonized regulations, more investment in critical infrastructure, and more political will, especially in Nigeria. The TAH 7 will potentially accelerate the trade in West Africa to new heights.

Furthermore, the regional organizations in Africa and West Africa are crucial in the effectiveness of the development of TAH 7. However, the AU, ECOWAS, and AfDB clearly struggle with effective policy, cooperation with states, and implementation strategies. These organizations also provide financial, technical, and political support for regional infrastructure projects. However, the analysis shows us how these organizations’ capabilities are hampered by limited resources, faced with complex coordination in multinational projects, and shifting priorities amongst member states, sometimes resulting in realpolitik. In the case of TAH 7, we clearly see a need to create better alignments amongst many African states.

Corruption as a barrier to development and investment

As highlighted in the analysis, corruption severely hampers the development of projects like TAH 7. While there are available data on corruption index scores and surveys, corruption is difficult to measure, especially in what context it would affect

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the TAH 7 project. However, the available data allows for assumptions to be made. Corruption's reputation in West Africa and Africa, in general, makes investors alert and careful with investments, especially FDIs. There are reasons to be concerned, considering the region's widespread track record of embezzlement, bribery, and nepotism. These factors do not just divert crucial resources, but they also erode fair competition, making it challenging to launch TAH 7 effectively. The countries TAH 7 is passing by have different levels of corruption. Such variance in corruption levels might affect the project execution and timelines, slowing down the process. Additionally, suppose there are or will be corruption cases within contract awards and allocations of funds. In that case, it can lead to bidders with connections or bribes winning contracts over better-merited bidders. This can significantly affect quality and road works, which will potentially wear down the road more rapidly. Furthermore, less qualified companies might also shortcut and use substandard materials and construction practices, which might result in inflated costs due to bribes and kickbacks, resulting in the roads needing more frequent repairs, leading to disruptions in trade and mobility in the region. Diversion of funds caused by embezzlement and inflated invoices hampers the financial resources allocated for road upgrades and maintenance. Such practices allow for a vicious cycle where roads deteriorate quicker than budgets are designed for, leading the project into a cycle of higher long-term costs and economic losses. Corruption might have an impact beyond immediate concerns of construction quality and financial management as it undermines trust in public institutions, discouraging domestic and foreign investments in TAH 7. The corruption environment in West Africa might also create uncertainty for investors because they must account for unpredictable costs and risks associated with corruption. This can make the investors look for other regions and countries to invest in, which can contribute to depriving the region of needed infrastructure development. We can already look at the lengthy process of planning and executing the TAH 7, considering the project has been planned for over 50 years at this point, interpreting the delay as uncertainties for investors and reflects the overall challenges of conducting economic development, trade, and sustainable development in the region (OECD, 2022, pp. 6-11).

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Pan-American Highway comparison

Lastly, comparing the Pan-American Highway illustrates a relevant example of the transformative potential such a vast highway network fosters regional integration and economic diversification. The Pan-American Highway also faces physical barriers in Panama, but the road network ties together all of North America and South America. Most importantly, it showcases how it is possible to connect two massive continents, underscoring the importance of political will and cooperation across borders. The mentioned African organizations, and especially Nigeria, can learn from policies used and challenges faced during the development of the Pan-American Highway to better navigate the complexities of regional infrastructure development and aim to create prosperity for not just their respective countries in coastal West Africa, but also for the benefit of better connecting to the rest of the continent.

CONCLUSION

Throughout this thesis, I have investigated the landscape of the Trans African Highway 7, dissecting the myriad of factors that have contributed to the underdevelopment of the infrastructure project. Through the lens of international political economy, I have dived into the complex interplays between geographic and historical legacies, trade interests, weak political organizations and dynamics, and corruption, shaping the trajectory of TAH 7. Both domestic and global interactions also shape this interplay. Applying Frieden and Martin’s theory has proven to be instrumental in decoding the complexities of the surroundings of TAH 7. By looking at the historical analysis, we can underscore the enduring impact of colonial infrastructure priorities, which has established a path of dependency, complicating efforts towards fostering stronger regional integration and modernization. Moreover, trade interests helped explore and reveal the paradox where the obvious need for infrastructure to bolster economic growth is hindered by the very conditions that this infrastructure project seeks to improve. These factors highlight how global pressure for economic integration and development intersects with domestic governance challenges such as political will, institutional capacity, and corruption. In this case,

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the “synergy” and “reverberation” effects from the two-level game framework illustrate how international negotiations and regional policies are both influenced by and influence domestic political economies, which shapes the outcome of TAH 7.

When investigating the regional organizations involved in the project, a gap between ambition and execution becomes clear from the exacerbated resource constraints combined with divergent national interests and operational inefficiencies. Then, adding corruption to the equation visualizes how much of a barrier embezzlement, bribes, and nepotism emerge as a formidable barrier that does not only divert resources but simultaneously erodes the trust in public institutions and decreases the enthusiasm amongst foreign and domestic investors. By analyzing the African Continental Free Trade Areas, we can see the transformative potential of regional integration, but bureaucratic and existing infrastructural impediments still constrain these. We can say that TAH 7 is standing at a crossroads, symbolically representing West Africa’s broader development challenges and aspirations as the highway realization necessitates a joint effort beyond national boundaries to leverage regional solidarity and international cooperation. In the thesis, I advocate for a more substantial commitment to addressing the previously highlighted systemic issues, with a particular emphasis on fostering better transparency, enhancing institutional capacity, and prioritizing sustainable development practices. These actions are crucial for unlocking the TAH 7 potential to act as a catalyst for economic integration to foster social cohesion and simply pave the way for one of history’s largest up-and-coming generations, allowing them to make Africa into a significant industrial and economic powerhouse.

To conclude, the development trajectory of TAH 7 summarizes the widespread challenges and opportunities visible in West Africa. Addressing history, aligning trade interests, strengthening regional organizations, and combating corruption are of vital importance for the highway’s success. This project goes way beyond creating a corridor from point A to B; it symbolizes West Africa’s journey into a new order of regional integration, better economic resilience, and shared prosperity. The main results of this thesis indicate that the path forward now requires a collaborative and

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multifaced approach that includes innovation, inclusivity, and integrity to lay the groundwork for transforming and modernizing West Africa.

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