Handling a Fake Port Scan in SOC Lab by Manish RawatHandling a Fake Port Scan in SOC Lab by Manish Rawat

Handling a Fake Port Scan in SOC Lab

Manish Rawat

Manish Rawat

From Alert to Action: How I Handled a Fake Port Scan in My SOC Lab

3 min read
·
2 days ago
By Manish — Security Operations | Blue Team Analyst

Summary

It’s easy to detect a port scan. What matters is what you do next.
This write-up walks through how I simulated a basic Nmap port scan, detected it using Wazuh + Suricata, and walked the alert through the triage process — just like it would happen in a real SOC.
More than just detection, this is about answering:
Is it a threat? A false positive? Do we escalate or tune it out?

Environment

Detection Stack: Wazuh + Suricata + ELK Stack
Monitored Host: Kali Linux (dual role: attacker + monitored endpoint)
SIEM Interface: Kibana (Wazuh dashboard)
The focus was on triggering, capturing, and analyzing alert activity based on a simple but common network event.

Simulating the Attack: Nmap Scan

To trigger a controlled detection, I ran the following Nmap scan:
nmap -sS -T4 127.0.0.1
This performed a TCP SYN scan on the localhost, mimicking the most common early-stage reconnaissance behavior.

Detection: Suricata + Wazuh Integration

Suricata — running in IDS mode — flagged the scan with the following alert:
ET SCAN Nmap Scripting Engine User-Agent DetectedPriority: 2Signature ID: 2010935
This alert was then parsed by Wazuh and forwarded to Elasticsearch. In Kibana, it appeared under the suricata.eve.alert dataset with full packet and rule context.

Investigation: Log Context + Behavioral Patterns

My triage approach focused on the investigation pipeline, not just the raw alert.
Source/Destination Analysis:
Internal IP scanning localhost
No lateral or external IPs observed
Confined within test subnet
Frequency & Pattern:
Single occurrence
No follow-up connections or payloads
System Behavior:
No abnormal process activity (ps, top, audit logs clean)
No outbound data transfer

Triage Decision

Based on correlation and lack of post-scan behavior, the scan was:
🔎 Low-confidence recon activity, likely benign/internal
I marked it as Informational, with no escalation required.
But I didn’t dismiss it blindly. I documented:
Detection rule hit
Asset impacted
Time of event
Why it was not escalated
This creates traceability — a key part of a SOC analyst’s job.

Analyst Thought Process (What I’d Do in a Real SOC)

Question Answer Was this alert expected? No, but controlled and explainable Was it targeted? No — localhost only Did anything follow the scan? No lateral movement, no payloads Do I suppress this alert? No — one-time internal scan Do I need a case in TheHive or equivalent? Not for this — but notes were recorded

Noise Management

Rather than disabling the signature, I tuned the rule to:
Alert only when scan targets more than 10 ports
Suppress alerts from known internal testing tools via tag (nmap_local_test)
This kept visibility open while reducing false flags during dev/test cycles.

Final Thoughts

This exercise was less about catching the scan — and more about showing the discipline to ask the right questions, trust the data, and make a defensible call.
That’s what separates a rule-writer from a real blue team analyst.

What’s Next

Add TheHive to capture triage documentation formally
Trigger a multi-host scan to simulate horizontal recon
Enrich alerts with asset criticality scoring for better triage filters
#BlueTeam #SOCAnalyst #ThreatDetection #CyberSecurity #Suricata #Wazuh #ELKStack #IncidentResponse #SecurityOperations #DetectionEngineering #AlertTriage #Nmap #NetworkSecurity #HomeLab #InfoSec
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Posted Jun 16, 2025

Simulated and triaged a fake port scan in a SOC lab.

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Timeline

Jun 13, 2025 - Jun 14, 2025