About the Author(s)

Syed Salman Mehdi holds a PGD in Software Technology and a BS in IT. He has a strong background in research and writing, specializing in geopolitical issues and history. Apart from his writing, he has expertise in IT, systems analysis, and academic content creation.

The three-tiered SIFC has turned out to be one of the most vital building blocks in Pakistan’s economic revival strategy. As set up to attract foreign investment, reform bureaucratic structures, and foster critical strategic initiatives, the SIFC is a positive development. However, it is measured against political possibility, civil-military relations, and the systemic vices of governance, which can set in to frustrate its results.

The SIFC has made significant, realistic improvements. Core inflation fell significantly and reached 4.9% in November 2024, the lowest index since 2018 (PBS). Fiscally transformative measures are focused on reducing inflation to 7% within the next five years, although the growth had been estimated from 3.6% to 5.5% in the next three years (MoF P, 2024 Economic Outlook). Then, the debt-to-GDP projection is to d 6ecline to 68.6% by 2025 and 66.6% by 2027. Such words from the IMF reflect financial stability.

Firstly, the government’s revived construction of the 1,100-TEU containership at the Karachi Shipyard clearly indicates the revival of maritime capabilities in the country. This $24.75 million plan is in line with the SIFC’s general intention to industrialise, create jobs, and expand the blue economy.

Continued attempts to muster Saudi investments through ten saleable projects prove the government’s efforts in utilizing foreign relations for economic development.

Nevertheless, these accomplishments remain masked by systemic inefficiencies and governance issues threatening the SIFC’s future solvency. The council criticises a centralised decision-making format due to adverse impacts that can limit provincial democracy and depower democratic policies.

For instance, delays in implementing projects like the Siah Dik Copper Project in Baluchistan are evidence of unresolved bureaucratic issues, per information available in Balochistan Mining Updates, 2024. Moreover, a lack of disclosure and weak interaction with users and other stakeholders complicate the council’s assessment of the stated goals and aspirations.

Historically, political conditions in Pakistan have always been problem-ridden with dynastic politics and politically fragmented provinces, which have typically acted as barriers to any concrete reforms. Successive governments, both civilian and military, have struggled to implement policies that transcend short-term political gains. These structural problems remain; this, for example, can be seen in the failure to implement past economic programs consistently.

Again, it should build bipartisan support and guarantee that its programs are beyond the influence of politics. As with promissory economic projects such as the Pakistan Steel Mills revival, political intervention has proven to be a hard-core break of political goals due to other political interferences, as evidenced by the Economic Research Institute of Pakistan.

In response to SIFC’s demands, the Economic Coordination Committee (ECC) has made many development projects, supplementary grants, and subsidies more readily available. These consist of creating the Siah Dik Copper Project and reorganising the Pakistan Revenue Automation Limited (PRAL) (Minister of Finance). These policies aim to revitalise mining, construction, and IT segments to have an efficient, diversified economy.

Council partnership with the private sector thus supports its other facet. The existence of synergistic public-private partnerships is demonstrated by the work that the government can do with the help of organizations such as the Rawalpindi Chamber of Commerce and Industry (RCCI) in matters of infrastructure and taxes. Examples, including the Rawalpindi Ring Road and the government drive to advance the use of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), indicate the continuous emphasis on sustainable urban development and investment.

The SIFC could learn from many developed countries how they got to where they are now, e.g., Malaysia’s Economic Planning Unit and Singapore Economic Development Board, among others. These models consider openness, efficiency of the agencies’ interaction, and effective cooperation with the private sector as key advantages (World Bank Development Reports).

For the SIFC to record similar achievements, it requires working for increased transparency and accountability. To ensure that the council’s activities correspond to national and provincial intentions, independent audit structures must be developed, different stakeholders must be involved, and decision-making must be decentralised.

Complaints about dynastic politicians and military encroachment in politics should not blind society to the council’s ability to foster economic growth. By adopting a balanced approach that combines strategic planning with inclusive policymaking, the SIFC can catalyze transformative change.

Between Pakistan’s economic rebirth and operation and stagnation, only this council’s heads-and-shoulders expertise exists in the soft art of managing high expectations and realizable goals. This includes redesigning the system to identify the appropriate lines of work, engaging all the stakeholders involved, and using international examples. Consequently, if these goals were realized, the SIFC could foster better economies and stability.

The Special Investment Facilitation Council is a good chance for the country to reboot its economy and move forward. So far, it has implemented some measures, providing hope for improvement. Addressing system issues and promoting a new governance model will continue to be critical for the long-term success of the NDIS. While Pakistan currently faces an uncertain future, the success of converting ambitious plans into realistic projects will define the success of the SIFC.

The views and opinions expressed in this article/paper are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Paradigm Shift.