Freelance Cybersecurity SpecialistsFreelance Cybersecurity Specialists
Cyber expert specialising in Azure Security Services.
$10k+
Earned
4x
Hired
5.0
Rating
22
Followers
Cyber expert specialising in Azure Security Services.
AI Systems Architect | Agentic AI, Integrations & Security
$1k+
Earned
2x
Hired
5.0
Rating
497
Followers
AI Systems Architect | Agentic AI, Integrations & Security
Microsoft 365 & Azure Solutions Architect
$5k+
Earned
2x
Hired
5.0
Rating
14
Followers
Microsoft 365 & Azure Solutions Architect
Cover image for Have you wondered how hacekrs
Have you wondered how hacekrs bypass MFA? Nowadays it is getting easier. There is a phishing kit called Mirage2FA that has been working against Microsoft 365 since late 2024. Here is how it goes. The user lands on a fake login page. They type their password. They approve the MFA prompt on their phone. Everything they enter is passed straight through to Microsoft in real time, so the sign-in genuinely succeeds and looks completely normal to them. Microsoft issues the session tokens, and the kit keeps a copy. With those cookies someone can read the mailbox, open SharePoint and OneDrive, and reach anything sitting behind SSO. They never see a second prompt, because the authentication already happened. ANY.RUN (http://ANY.RUN) put numbers on it. 9,426 accounts targeted across 3,518 domains, roughly 4,532 showing signs of compromise, most of them in the US. A third of the successful logins happened on phones, where you can barely see the URL you are looking at. The advice going around is to switch on Continuous Access Evaluation. I would switch it on too. Just read the documentation first, because it does something slightly different to what people assume. CAE sessions run tokens for up to 28 hours. The default is one hour. What you get in exchange is revocation when something happens, and Microsoft is specific about what counts: the account is disabled or deleted, the password is changed or reset, MFA gets turned on, an admin revokes refresh tokens, or ID Protection flags the user as high risk. Allow up to 15 minutes for that to propagate. IP location is the only one that applies straight away. Three things worth knowing before you lean on it. It covers Exchange Online, SharePoint Online and Teams. Guest accounts are not supported, which is where a lot of contractor access lives. And it only reads IP-based named locations, so a country-based policy buys you nothing here. If I were fixing this in a tenant tomorrow, in this order: Phishing-resistant sign-in first. A FIDO2 key checks the domain it is talking to, so it will not hand anything over to a proxy wearing Microsoft's face. CAE on, so revocation actually reaches the services. Then a runbook where you revoke sessions before you reset the password. Reset first and you have changed the lock while someone is still inside holding a key that works. If session cookies walked out of your tenant this morning, what would notice, and how long would it take? Source: ANY.RUN (http://ANY.RUN) threat research, 19 August 2026. CAE behaviour from Microsoft Learn.
1
1
165
HMI Interface designer. UX/UI for embedded screens & devices
$10k+
Earned
2x
Hired
4.4
Rating
53
Followers
HMI Interface designer. UX/UI for embedded screens & devices
Cyber Security Analyst
Cyber Security Analyst
Web, API and Android Penetration Tester
New to Contra
Web, API and Android Penetration Tester
Cover image for Comprehensive validation testing, proof-of-concept verification,
Comprehensive validation testing, proof-of-concept verification, and structural remediation audits to ensure complete security patch efficacy. The Objective: A development organization required a rigorous follow-up assessment to validate that security patches introduced after an initial audit were correctly implemented, completely neutralized the identified threat vectors, and did not introduce new regression flaws into the environment. The Approach: I executed a dedicated verification cycle focused specifically on replicating the original attack patterns using the exact tools and exploits from the initial assessment. Every patch was manually tested using Burp Suite Professional, custom Python exploit scripts, and runtime debuggers to confirm the vulnerability's status and measure remediation success against standard CVSS 3.1 metrics. From a dedicated retesting scope targeting 20 original security findings, I delivered the following lifecycle results: Closed (Remediated): Successfully verified the resolution of 16 findings, including all critical business logic bypasses and sensitive data exposure pathways, confirming they are no longer exploitable. Bypassed (Incomplete Fixes): Identified 2 instances where a development team used client-side input validation instead of server-side sanitization, allowing the original exploit to still bypass the patch. New Regression: Discovered 2 minor configuration errors introduced by changes made to the access control framework during the patching process. Documentation Provided: Delivered updated Proof-of-Concept (PoC) logs and step-by-step documentation for the outstanding issues to guide the team to a permanent fix.
0
63
Cover image for Comprehensive external/internal network penetration test,
Comprehensive external/internal network penetration test, cloud infrastructure review, and vulnerability assessment for a production hosting ecosystem. The Objective: A production hosting provider required a full-scope security audit to evaluate their perimeter defense, verify compliance with the CIS Benchmarks and OWASP Top 10 for Cloud, and uncover critical misconfigurations before public deployment. The Approach: I executed a hybrid security assessment combining automated infrastructure reconnaissance with deep manual configuration checks. Every vulnerability was manually validated using tools like Nmap, Wireshark, and CloudBrute to eliminate false positives and scored using standard CVSS 3.1 metrics. From a single comprehensive audit, I uncovered 31 reproducible findings: 3 High Severity: Exposed database backups publicly accessible via misconfigured AWS S3 buckets, and unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) vectors on perimeter network appliances. 6 Medium Severity: Overly permissive IAM policies granting excessive root privileges, missing multi-factor authentication (MFA) enforcement on management panels, and outdated SSH protocol versions in use. 10 Low Severity: Unrestricted directory listings on internal staging servers, insecure network daemon configurations, and loose firewall rules permitting unnecessary inbound traffic. 12 Informational: Internal IP address disclosures in HTTP response headers, missing asset tagging, and verbose system version banners.
0
65